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This paper addresses a current debate in the bioethics
community between principlists, who consider that
principles are at the heart of moral life, and narrativists,
who see communication at its core. Using a case study
entitled ‘‘The forgetful mourner’’ to introduce the tensions
between each of these positions, I go on to explain the
central tenets of both principlism and narrative ethics.
Rather than focus on their respective weaknesses, which
many theorists do, I emphasise instead, the contribution
that each approach can make to understanding moral life
and the process of ethical decision making in health care
situations. My ultimate aim is to identify the, sometimes
overlapping, skills that both principlism and narrative
ethics require on the part of health professionals who
deploy them. I conclude that a good principlist has
narrativist tendencies and a good narrativist is inclined
toward principlism.
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T
his paper examines and tests the parameters
of a debate that has been taking place in the
bioethics community in recent years. The
debate is best expressed as one between those
theorists who see principles at the heart of moral
life and those who see communication at its core.
The former position is generally described as
principlism; the latter, has become known as
narrative ethics. I intend to explain and assess
these positions, not, however, with a view to
privileging one over the other: many books and
articles have already been written which point to
serious weaknesses in both of them. (For some of
the standard criticisms of principlism see:
Clouser KD and Gert B,1 DuBose ER, Hamel RP
and O’Connell LJ,2 and Davis RB.3 For some of
the standard criticisms of narrative ethics, see:
Clouser KD,4 and Lindemann Nelson H.5) Rather,
I want to present each perspective in its best
light, highlighting its positive features and
strengths. Ultimately, my intention is to identify
the skills that each of these approaches require
on the part of health professionals who deploy
them.
To begin my exploration of principlism and
narrative ethics, I examine a case study and, in
turn, a moral issue that regularly arises when
caring for people with Alzheimer’s disease. This
case, published in the Hastings Center Report
(1995), and entitled ‘‘The forgetful mourner’’
concerns an eighty six year old Italian American
woman with moderate dementia, Mrs C.6 She is
admitted to a nursing home when her son Tony,
with whom she has been living, falls ill. When,
after two years, Tony dies suddenly the staff in
the nursing home are especially concerned for
Mrs C. In the days and weeks that follow the
funeral, she continues to ask how Tony is doing
as if he is still alive.
After consulting with staff, the director of the
Alzheimer unit, Dr L, decides that Mrs C’s
questions should be answered truthfully: she
should be told that Tony has died. Each time this
is done, however, Mrs C becomes distraught,
enduring the pain of her son’s death over and
over again. While everyone finds this very
hard, Dr L hopes that their patience and
persistence will enable Mrs C to remember
what really happened. The only alternative seems
to be a grave and sustained deception on the
part of everyone who has a relationship with
Mrs C.
As it turns out, Mrs C is told of her son’s death
at least fifteen times, and each time she
experiences the grief of her loss anew. Then,
one of the nurses, Ms F, suggests that Mrs C put
on the black dress she had been wearing on the
day she attended Tony’s funeral. This she does
and it seems to help her to remember. Even
though Mrs C continues to talk about Tony, she
no longer asks how he is doing.
The two commentaries that follow the case of
‘‘The forgetful mourner’’ take opposite views of
the response of Dr L to Mrs C’s bereavement.
(‘‘The forgetful mourner’’ is also discussed in the
light of the different responses of Dr L and Ms F
in Parker M and Dickenson D.7) The first
commentary, by Tony Yang-Lewis, is sympa-
thetic toward both Dr L and Ms F. He takes the
view that, however painful it is, in this case,
communicating the truth to Mrs C, in whatever
fashion, is the right and respectful thing to do
because it acknowledges the importance of her
relationship with her son. According to Yang-
Lewis, it is Mrs C’s memory that is eroded, but
not necessarily her sense of self—and her
relationship with her son is integral to that sense
of self.8
The second commentary, by Harry R Moody,
however, takes a much harsher line and remarks:
‘‘No more poignant example of fanaticism is
imaginable than the devotion to abstract princi-
ple—truth telling—revealed by this case’’.9
Arguing that Dr L’s devotion to truth telling is
misguided because it ignores the anguish and
pointless pain of the patient that it causes,
Moody heaps praise on the experimental and
imaginative approach of Ms F, which he sees as
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an alternative to the ‘‘philosophical faith’’ or ‘‘creed’’ of
principlism. He takes the view that Ms F’s action in relation
to the black dress is motivated not by the principle of truth
telling, but by the desire to communicate with the patient in
a way that does not prejudge the outcome. The immediate
effect of the black dress, for Moody, is that it validates Mrs
C’s sense of loss. Ultimately, it may or may not succeed in
getting Mrs C to understand and accept the truth about her
son. In sum, it is communication, not principlism, which is
key to moral life for Moody. Note that while Moody is hostile
to what he calls, ‘‘principlism’’, he is not completely adverse
to principles because at the end of his commentary, he
suggests that we should forge a ‘‘communicative ethic’’
which unites principles and prudence with experiment and
practical imagination.9 This paper hopes to contribute in
some way to the development of such a position.
PRINCIPLISM
What is known as the principlist approach to ethical decision
making has dominated Western bioethics for the last twenty
years. It emerged with the publication of several well known
texts in the 1970s and 80s. One of these was the Belmont
Report which identified basic principles that would underlie
and guide the regulation of research involving human
subjects.10 Three books, also published at that time, outlined
and defended a principlist ethical framework, those of Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress, Robert Veatch, and H
Tristram Engelhardt.11 12 13
This paper examines the account developed by Beauchamp
and Childress in their book, Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
What is especially attractive about this particular principlist
model (hereafter called the PBE model) is that, since its first
appearance in 1979, the authors have continuously refined
and honed its central elements in response to numerous
objections that have been made to it over the years. This
reworking of their position has, I think, made it more
resistant to the problems endemic to principlism generally
and more inclusive of other features of the moral world that
it had, initially, ignored.
The PBE model is an ethical decision making process which
negotiates between fundamental principles, on the one hand,
and the unique nature of specific moral situations on the
other. It makes three central claims which I will, first, briefly
summarise and then examine in more detail.
1. Basic principles and the specific action guiding rules that
are derived from them are central to the ethical decision
making process in health care situations.
2. In any given health care situation, any decision or course
of action is morally justified if it is consistent with
relevant principles, rules, background theoretical com-
mitments, and particular judgments.
3. The success of the task of justification in 2 can be
measured by the degree to which it achieves an overall
cohesion of all of the elements of the decision making
process.
1. On the PBE model, while background theories such as
those concerning human nature or personhood and the
particular judgments we make in concrete situations are
considered to be important elements of the ethical decision
making process, four basic principles are privileged:
N autonomy: respect the views, choices, and actions of
others
N non-maleficence: avoid causing harm
N beneficence: act for the benefit of others
N justice: treat people fairly
A good deal of the Principles of Biomedical Ethics text is taken
up with an analysis and discussion of each of the four
principles in terms of their nature and scope. In particular,
the specific rules that are supported by these principles and
that permit, prohibit, or require particular kinds of action are
delineated. These include rules governing truth telling,
privacy, confidentiality, and informed consent.14
What is special about these principles is their supposed
universal or objective nature. Beyond tradition, individual
vagaries, and culture, Beauchamp and Childress claim that
these principles have been drawn from a ‘‘common mor-
ality’’, the set of norms that ‘‘all morally serious persons
share’’ (Beauchamp T, Childress J,14 p 3). According to them:
‘‘The common morality contains moral norms that bind all
persons in all places; no norms are more basic in the moral
life’’ and they refer to the notion of international human
rights as an example of such universal norms (Beauchamp T,
Childress J,14 p 3). Having grounded their four principles,
they justify their particular choice by pointing out that these
four have been presupposed by traditional ethical theories
and medical codes throughout history.
2. The most immediate way to decide on the merits of a
proposed course of action, on the PBE model, is to determine
whether or not that course of action obeys the moral rules
that are derived from the four principles, On this view—for
example, a health professional might consider that it is,
generally, morally required to provide a patient with
information about their illness because this action obeys
the moral rule ‘‘Tell the truth’’ which is, in turn, derived from
the principle, ‘‘Respect patient autonomy’’.
In morally difficult situations, however, where there is a
conflict between principles, or between principles and
particular judgments, the PBE model stipulates that none
of the principles is a priori privileged. In any given situation,
each principle must be specified and weighed relative to the
particular context in which it is applied and informed by
generally accepted background theories of human life and
nature. Following John Rawls, this weighing and balancing is
described as a process of ‘‘reflective equilibrium’’ and the
principles are described as prima facie rather than absolute
(Beauchamp J, Childress T,14 p 398). This is to express the
idea that any one principle is, on first impression, morally
obligatory but that it may be modified or overridden in
certain situations. In the case of ‘‘The forgetful mourner’’—
for example, Ms F might initially believe, along with Dr L,
that telling Mrs C the truth about her son’s death is the
morally correct thing to do. In the actual face to face
encounter with Mrs C, however, she seems to balk at the pain
she inflicts and desists. In this case, it could be argued that it
is her particular judgment in the concrete situation which
prompts her to reconsider whether the rule of truth telling, or
some other rule, should apply here.
3. As 2 indicates, the process of reflective equilibrium
involves the specification, reciprocal weighing, testing,
revising, and balancing of principles, rules, background
theories, and particular judgments. For Beauchamp and
Childress, the objective here is to reduce any conflict among
our beliefs by fitting them into a coherent whole:
So called wide reflective equilibrium occurs when we
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of all plausible
moral judgments, principles, and relevant background
theories. Here we incorporate as wide a variety of kinds
and levels of legitimate beliefs as possible, including hard
test cases in experience. … No matter how wide the pool
of beliefs, we have no reason to anticipate that the process
of pruning, adjusting, and rendering coherent will either
come to an end or be perfected. A moral framework is
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more a process than a finished product; and moral
problems … should be considered projects in need of
continual adjustment by reflective equilibrium (Beauchamp
J, Childress J,14 p 399).
On this understanding, the processes of moral deliberation
are akin to scientific processes: they involve the setting up of
hypotheses that are tested and modified or rejected on the
basis of reasoning and experience. In turn, the aim of
unifying all one’s moral beliefs and background commit-
ments is analogous to the scientific goal of achieving
theoretical consistency and unity.
What is clear from this account of the PBE model is that,
granted each of its three key claims, it provides a method of
supporting ethical decisions that has a strong justificatory
force. Put simply, on this view, the force of the imperative,
‘‘Tell the truth’’, derives from its grounding in universally
accepted norms, not—for example, in the subjective view-
point or intuition of the health professional. Moreover, even
in situations of doubt and uncertainty, such as that of ‘‘The
forgetful mourner’’, the deliberative process which comes
into play appeals to reasoning strategies and goals that are
also considered objective, not intuitive.
NARRATIVE ETHICS
While different shades of principlism have dominated the
health care landscape in the last twenty years, an increasing
number of theorists have begun to turn their attention to
alternative approaches to describing and understanding the
various elements of moral life. One such approach deploys
narrative concepts and methodologies drawn from literary
criticism and philosophy as tools of moral understanding and
assessment. For critical examinations of different narrative
approaches to bioethics see Lindemann Nelson H.15 16 See also
Greenhalgh and Hurwitz, who insist on the need for clinical
training in interpretative skills to improve the diagnosis and
treatment of illness.17 See also Montgomery Hunter K for a
short overview of the role of narrative theory in bioethics.18 In
common with contemporary thinkers in other disciplines—
for example, anthropology, philosophy, cognitive psychology,
and history, who have turned their attention to narratives,
narrativists in the health care arena argue that the first
person narrative, or personal story, is a rich medium for
qualitative data about the unique lives of individual people.
Further, for some of these theorists, the narrative is not only
an important form of communication, it is also a means of
making human life and, specifically the moral life, intelligi-
ble. (The meaning of the term ‘‘narrative’’ invokes two kinds
of activities—telling and knowing. ‘‘Narrative’’ comes via the
Latin terms: narro¨ [relate, tell] from the original Sanskrit root
gnaˆ [know] and gna¨rus [knowing, acquainted with, expert,
skilful]).19 While they deploy narrative tools in different
ways, I suggest that all of these thinkers are engaged in
‘‘narrative ethics’’. For a dissenting view see Hudson Jones
A.20
Martha Nussbaum—for example, views literature as a vast
resource of moral knowledge and a means of sensitising
people to the responsibilities, obligations, and challenges of a
full moral life.21 22 Alternatively, the narrative approaches of
Albert Jonsen, Stephen Toulmin, and John Arras take a
casuistic turn and resolve ethical dilemmas by comparing
each new situation with others and with paradigm cases.23 24
These authors argue that local, contingent moral rules and
maxims to guide action can be derived from paying attention
to the morally relevant similarities and differences between
cases.
More recently, Rita Charon has suggested that our under-
standing of medical cases will be greatly enhanced if we pay
attention to their narrative elements—for example, the
function of the narrator or author, the development of plot,
and the relationship between text and reader(s).25 In addition
to supporting Charon’s view, Tod Chambers has sparked a
lively debate in the bioethics community, arguing that the
task of reporting cases is itself, not a neutral enterprise.26 This
is because, he argues, the process of describing any set of
events involves decisions about including or excluding
certain pieces of information and making choices about the
way different facts are presented.
Finally, narrativists such as Howard Brody, Arthur Frank,
Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul
Ricoeur, and Margaret Urban Walker argue, not only that
the narrative approach to morally difficult situations
enhances existing models of decision making such as
principlism, but that the narrative approach is itself
theoretically robust.27–34 At the very least, it radically
challenges the theoretical adequacy of models such as
principlism. At best, it provides an alternative means of
justifying ethical decisions which focuses on the relational
and communicative dimensions of moral situations.
Because narrative ethics is in its early stages of develop-
ment, there is, as yet, no ready to hand canonical position
that best expresses its central tenets. Indeed, as I have
indicated, ‘‘narrative ethics’’ is a term which covers a very
diverse range of thinkers, from those who view narratives as
a rich resource for existing ethical theories, to those who see
the concepts and methodologies associated with the study of
narratives as the foundation of a bioethical theory that can
serve as an alternative to traditional models. In what follows,
I will roughly sketch what I see as the most plausible and
defensible account of narrative ethics. It is also one which
highlights the tensions between narrative ethics and princip-
lism and exposes the congruities and incongruities between
these supposedly competing positions. The central tenets are:
1. Every moral situation is unique and unrepeatable and its
meaning cannot be fully captured by appealing to law
like universal principles.
2. In any given health care situation, any decision or course
of action is justified in terms of its fit with the individual
life story or stories of the patient. These, in turn, are
understood and assessed on the basis of ‘‘narrative
reflective equilibrium’’.
3. The objective of the task of justification in 2 is not
necessarily to unify moral beliefs and commitments, but
is to open up dialogue, challenge received views and
norms, and explore tensions between individual and
shared meanings.
1. For narrativists, understanding an individual’s life as a
narrative and deploying narrative methodologies to read and
interpret it, broadens and enriches our understanding of that
life and deepens our insight into the relationship between the
unravelling of human life and moral agency.
On this view, when ethically challenging situations arise, it
is not the medical chart, the proposed treatment, and the
ethical rules that might govern that treatment which are at
the centre of moral interest. Rather, it is the whole journey of
an individual’s life as they conceive it themselves that is
privileged. Howard Brody—for example, sees the practice of
medicine, in part, ‘‘as a storytelling enterprise’’:
The concept of ‘‘story’’ suggests appreciation of a
narrative mode—that certain sorts of events can be fully
understood only as portions of certain ongoing narrative
and not as disconnected events occurring in isolation. In
contrast, much of modern medical ethics is ‘‘rule’’ and
‘‘decision’’ oriented, suggesting that precisely such an
Principlism or narrative ethics? 67
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ahistorical, non-narrative form of ethical analysis is
optimal (Brody H,27 p xiii).
For Brody, actions are made meaningful in the context of
an individual life story. As such, it is difficult to isolate any
given decision or choice, to uncouple it from the whole
person who acts, and to evaluate it in terms of abstract and
general rules.
2. Narrativists approach the question of moral justification
in a variety of different ways. Alasdair MacIntyre, for
example, claims that what is significant about human beings
is not their ability to make choices (and so obey or disobey
universal rules) but their social embeddedness.30 He considers
that an individual’s very capacity for choice is shaped,
enabled, and made meaningful by the traditions of her or his
community. In turn, he argues that the moral acceptability of
any given choice can be measured in terms of its consistency
with the narrative unity of an individual life—past, present,
and future—and in terms of its coherence with whatever
deep values and conceptions of the morally good life are
already established in the communities in which the
individual lives (MacIntyre A,30 pp 181–225).
Others argue that the narrative approach cannot justify
privileging one choice over another in moral situations.
Postmodernists such as Michel Foucault, for example, claim
that the whole narrativist project is ill fated from both a
moral and an epistemic point of view.35 He argues, firstly, that
the cycle of a human life is characterised more by its
fragmentation than its unity and, secondly, that narrative
interpretation invokes a range of different narrative forms
and genres, not a single authoritative reading as MacIntyre
would have it. If several stories can be told about a life that is,
itself, not internally coherent, then it is neither possible to fit
any given action unambiguously within a single life story, nor
to evaluate it within the terms of a single tradition.
Following philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur, Margaret
Urban Walker, and Hilde Lindemann Nelson, however, I
want to defend a third and more moderate view of narrative
justification.15 31–34 On this account, the first person narrative
is prima facie privileged. Not any tall tale will do, however, and
personal stories are tested against various criteria, such as the
stories of others and available documentary evidence. Why?
Firstly, because as we all well know, we are wont to be naı¨ve,
mistaken, and delusional about our beliefs and self under-
standings. Secondly, as Lindemann Nelson argues, our self
conceptions rely on the conceptions of others to make them
genuinely identity constituting—for example, I cannot
seriously view myself as someone who can teach health care
ethics unless some other folk see me that way too. In her
innovative and insightful book, Damaged Identities: Narrative
Repair, Lindemann Nelson challenges traditional notions of
moral agency, understood as rational choice, and instead,
understands the capacity for moral decision making as
enabled or disabled by the degree to which an individual’s
life story, and their sense of self, fits or fails to fit with the
dominant narratives of that individual’s community.16
Thirdly, our self conceptions are contextual: they get
constructed within culturally available narratives which both
enable and limit the kinds of people we can imagine
ourselves to be.
On this narrative account, the more credible stories are
those that capture what it is about our lives that matters most
to us. They are intelligible, consistent with biographical
events, and consistent with what we actually do. They also
explain best why we take responsibility for our actions, why
some things matter to us more than others, why we love or
hate, and why we are happy or hurt. Here I am indebted to
Lindemann Nelson’s account of narrative justification.
(Lindemann Nelson H,16 pp 92–105). I liken this idea of
testing personal narratives against various criteria to the way
in which the principlist model tests its principles through the
application of the process of reflective equilibrium. In the
case of the PBE model, the four principles are prima facie
privileged, but may be modified subsequently. On the
narrative view, it is first person narratives that are prima
facie privileged; however, like principles, they can be
challenged and modified in the process of what I am calling,
a ‘‘narrative reflective equilibrium’’. The final story or
account of a life that emerges from such evaluation is
described by Ricoeur, recalling the Socratic ideal, as ‘‘the fruit
of an examined life’’ (Ricoeur P,31 pp 246–7).
In recent years, a narrative approach of this kind has
contributed to discussion and debate in relation to end of life
decisions. It informs, for example, one of the recent
recommendations of the US Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs which suggests that, when it comes to making
decisions for incompetent patients, one of the tasks of a
surrogate decision maker is to consider ‘‘how the patient
constructed his or her identity or life story’’ in order to reach
a decision about a proposed course of treatment that
continues the story ‘‘in a manner that is meaningful and
consistent with the patient’s self conception’’.36 In addition,
the council argues that it is precisely the fact that a number
of different options might be consistent with a person’s life
story which makes the narrative approach so attractive
because it avoids having to predict only a single course of
action as compatible and, therefore, morally acceptable. See
also Kuczewski MG for a discussion about the relationship
between narrative and substituted judgment.37
3. The third tenet of narrative ethics is the claim that the
task of moral justification is not, primarily, a unifying one.
Rather, its focus is on acknowledging and embracing the
multiplicity of, often contested, meanings that are available
in any given situation. What is key for this narrativist account
is the idea that many different voices and readings of moral
situations and individual lives are possible. And, generally,
narrativists focus less on trying to reduce competing
perspectives to a commonly shared view and more on
involving as many people as possible in the dialogue. Anne
Hudson Jones summarises this view thus:
In ideal form, narrative ethics recognises the primacy of
the patient’s story but encourages multiple voices to be
heard and multiple stories to be brought forth by all those
whose lives will be involved in the resolution of a case.
Patient, physician, family, health professional, friend, and
social worker—for example, may all share their stories in
a dialogical chorus that can offer the best chance of
respecting all the persons involved in a case (Hudson
Jones A,20 p 222).
In turn, for narrativists, relational virtues such as
empathetic listening and support are privileged. In the course
of such privileging, these virtues are reworked to acknowl-
edge and accommodate the narrative view that, in some
senses, difference is irreducible. Howard Brody, for example,
radically reconceives the moral demands of ‘‘empathy’’ in the
following passage:
In a culture that prizes autonomy and independence, we
may fondly imagine that most people are whole and
intact, unlike those who suffer from disease. … Charity
tends to assume that I start off whole and remain whole
while I offer aid to the suffering. Empathy and testimony
require a full awareness of my own vulnerability and
radical incompleteness; to be with the suffering as a
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co-human presence will require that I change. … Today I
listen to the testimony of someone’s suffering; tomorrow
that person (or someone else) will be listening to my
testimony of my own. Today I help to heal the sufferer by
listening to and validating her story; tomorrow that
sufferer will have helped to heal me, as her testimony
becomes a model I can use to better make sense of and
deal with my own suffering (Brody H,27 pp 21–2).
On Brody’s view, the demand of empathy does not require
us to ‘‘step into another’s shoes’’ in order to understand their
pain. It does not presuppose that it is ever possible fully to
understand another’s pain. The other person is always
‘‘other’’ to us, her difference persists, resisting assimilation
under the umbrella of mutual understanding. Instead,
empathy demands that we bear witness to our own
vulnerability and lack so that we stand, not as whole to
part, or healthy to ill, but as a ‘‘co-human presence’’. On this
view, health professionals cannot offer patients the reassur-
ance that they know and understand them, only the
acknowledgement that they have listened and heard. On
this view too, no health professional is untouched by a
patient’s pain and vulnerability, there is professional engage-
ment, not detachment.
What is refreshing about the account of narrative ethics
outlined above is that it introduces the idea that the aim of
ethics is not, necessarily, to reduce discord, disunity, and
disagreement. Where principlism is lauded because of its
justificatory force—for example, its supposed objective rules
distinguishing between good and bad actions, and its
theoretical consistency, by contrast narrative ethics, as we
have seen, slides toward relativism and diversity with
seemingly wild abandon (MacIntyre excepted). Some might
see this slide as good reason to abandon narrative ethics for
the more stable and theoretically satisfying principlist
position. What if, however, one were to view the relativism
of narrative ethics not as a failure of comprehensiveness or
probity or insight, but rather, as pointing the way toward a
reframing of what we understand the task of ethics to be?
THE STRENGTHS OF PRINCIPLISM AND NARRATIVE
ETHICS
As my brief sketches indicate, the explicit theoretical
commitments of principlism and narrative ethics are very
different. Principlism takes a systematic approach to ethical
decision making and aims to render our deeply and
confidently held moral convictions into a consistent and
unified approach. On the other hand, narrative ethics takes
the individual life story in its unrepeatable uniqueness as the
starting point, and resists tendencies to generalise, even at
the risk of being accused of theoretical inadequacy. Given the
differences in their approaches, both positions have readily
identifiable strengths.
Firstly, as Beauchamp and Childress rightly claim, the PBE
model of principlism provides a clear method and vocabulary
for identifying and articulating ethical concerns in health
care situations and for negotiating moral ideas and argu-
ments. Specifically, if offers a simple ethical framework
within which to analyse, examine, and address the increas-
ingly complex issues that have emerged in bioethics in the
past forty years, such as new reproductive technologies,
organ and tissue transplantation, genetic engineering, and
the allocation of scarce resources.
Secondly, the PBE model is a particularly useful means of
drawing the parameters of moral relationships between
strangers. Following in a liberal and pluralist tradition, the
authors’ adoption of the four principles reflects their concern
to devise a method of decision making that adheres to rules
that people with different cultural backgrounds and world
views would consider morally acceptable. On the PBE model,
the four principles are considered to be binding on all moral
persons irrespective of culture or creed. This attempt to open
up a gap between individual intuition and generally
acceptable moral norms means that the PBE account is a
particularly important tool for legislators and public policy
makers, whose task is to regulate the conduct of various
individuals, groups, and institutions with different back-
ground views and agendas (such as in the case of research
facilities, hospitals, infertility clinics etc). At an individual
level, the four principles constrain and enable the conduct of
the health professional who must, for example, respect his or
her patients’ autonomy and right to fair and equal treatment
irrespective of religious, moral, or social differences between
them.
The strength of narrative ethics, on the other hand, is that
it provides a method and vocabulary for interpreting and
respecting the unique and personal stories of individuals. On
this view, any decision about medical treatment or health
care must be considered in the light of the patient’s
individual story or stories.
In addition, narrative ethics is strongly engaged with the
concrete and intersubjective lives of people. Where the focus
of principlism is on an ‘‘ethics of strangers’’, narrative ethics
places emphasis on the professional/patient relationship as
itself an ethical realm which is personal and affective. In this
realm, intimacy, vulnerability, and suffering haunt each
ordinary encounter and cannot be acknowledged or
addressed simply by obedience to rules. Knowing why it is
morally appropriate to listen to someone’s account of her
suffering is not the same as being there and knowing when
and how to do the listening. To do that, a person must not
only hold moral principles, these values must be integrated
into one’s life and heart.
Given the respective strengths of principlism and narrative
ethics, we might ask ourselves: must we be principlists,
wedded to the pursuit of an abstract, universal, comprehen-
sive, detached, impartial, objective, neat, exact, clear,
coherent system of ethical decision making? Or, must we
be narrativists cherishing the concrete, particular, provi-
sional, personal, partial, subjective, excessive, woolly, fuzzy,
engaged, fragmented dimensions of human life? If the task of
ethics is to develop and defend systematic approaches to
decision making, then the PBE model certainly seems to be
such a theory. On the other hand, if the business of ethics is
to foster skills of interpretation and communication, the
theory of narrative ethics seems a better candidate.
Casting ‘‘ethics’’, along with its aims and objectives, as
wholly one kind of pursuit or another seems, however,
ultimately foolhardy and counterproductive. Given that the
parameters of ‘‘ethics’’ have been drawn and redrawn for
centuries—think of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Christianity,
Islam, Kant, Bentham—there is no single account of the task
of ethics that is not historically and culturally constrained in
some way. Given that both principlism and narrative ethics
can be viewed as theoretical attempts to articulate a range of
ethical concerns that affect many people, a more modest
question is called for: what skills should health professionals
have in order to be able to deploy these different ethical
theories in their practice? Posing such a question makes it
possible to move the emphasis away from the philosophical
tensions and conflicts between principlism and narrative
ethics, and attend instead to the ways in which each of these
theories can help the health professional to make good
ethical decisions.
PRINCIPLIST AND NARRATIVIST SKILLS
For principlists and narrativists certain sets of skills are
important. To be a ‘‘good’’ principlist one must have: (1)
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conceptual and analytic skills to identify moral issues and
specify principles; (2) deductivist skills such as the ability to
apply general principles to particular cases; (3) critical skills
to assess and weigh principles and arguments, and (4)
reflective skills such as the ability to reflect on and reason
from particular experiences and cases to general rules.
Alternatively, to be a ‘‘good’’ narrativist one must have: (1)
literary skills and vocabulary to understand and interpret the
patient’s story; (2) critical skills such as the ability to fit
actions within a larger frame of meaning; (3) reflective skills
such as the ability to consider and test multiple narratives,
and (4) communicative skills, in order to negotiate the
professional/patient realm, such as the ability to ‘‘empathise’’
(in Brody’s sense) with the patient’s story. Narrativists
discuss narrative skills in different ways. See—for example,
Montgomery Hunter K, Charon R, and Coulehan JL’s paper
in Academic Medicine38 where they list a number of narrative
competencies that would better equip health care profes-
sionals for ethical decision making. These include a range of
abilities: to closely observe and identify patterns of meaning;
to follow complex plots; to imagine and be empathetic to
other life stories and experiences; to understand different
cultural, social, and religious perspectives, and to grow in self
awareness and self criticism. Or, see Hudson Jones’s paper in
HEC Forum, which emphasises three sets of narrative skills
that can be summarised as (1) interpretive (reading and
interpreting), (2) communicative (telling and writing), and
(3) interpersonal and empathetic.39
In sum, principlism primarily requires those skills which
force us to take a reflective step back from our intuitive
response to a situation and to determine instead what
general norms might apply in that instance. On the other
hand, while narrative ethics also challenges health profes-
sionals to step outside of their received values, its emphasis is
on individual people, their unique stories and circumstances
and so, for narrativists, communicative skills are central.
These sets of skills are not, however, mutually exclusive. Both
principlists and narrativists—for example, require critical and
reflective skills. Moreover, while principlists privilege the
move from general rules to particular cases they nevertheless
take individual situations, and the particular judgments these
call for, very seriously in their overall aim of unifying all of
the elements of the moral process. In the same way, while
narrativists privilege the personal story and unique situation,
they nevertheless interpret these within a more general
framework of multiple stories and shared understandings.
CONCLUSION
However different and conflicting principlist and narrative
theories appear to be, they point to important ethical skills
that health professionals should have, and, as I have argued,
these skills often overlap and reinforce one another. This is
evident in the case of ‘‘The forgetful mourner’’ and the two
commentaries of Moody and Yang-Lewis.
Given the account of narrative ethics that I have articulated
in this paper, which privileges life stories as a source of
personal and moral intelligibility, it could be argued that Dr
L’s decision to tell and retell Mrs C the truth about her son is
not, simply or solely, a case of principlism run riot. While
Moody’s hostile response to Dr L’s decision would have us
believe that this is so, Yang-Lewis argues that the decision of
the doctor and the nurse to communicate the truth to Mrs C
is morally justified because it supports her sense of self: the
act of telling her the truth fits with the story of Mrs C’s life in
which her son, Tony, plays a very important part. On this
view, Dr L’s and Ms F’s actions are warranted, not necessarily
because they are guided by principles, but because they are
informed by what these health professionals know of Mrs C’s
life story.
In short, the decision to tell Mrs C the truth can be morally
justified within the terms of both principlism and narrative
ethics. It follows that the justifiable concern which Moody
and many others might have with the doctor’s persistence
with ‘‘truth telling’’ does not, necessarily, lead to the
conclusion that the fault lies with principlism. The challenge
for the health professionals in this case lies not in the choice
of ethical theory—either one will do—but in their application
of it. What Dr L lacks and Ms F has in spades is moral
imagination and moral imagination is as much a requirement
of good principlism as it is of good narrative ethics. It would
seem that a ‘‘good’’ principlist pays attention to the
uniqueness of each moral situation and so, has narrativist
tendencies, and a ‘‘good’’ narrativist has a view to multiple
stories and shared meanings and, so, is inclined toward
principlism.
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